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ABSTRACT 
The twin predicaments of German labour market performance and welfare state 
performance triggered an ongoing debate on reforming the German model. Re-
cently, this debate has yielded an outcome in the form of the so-called Hartz 
laws, a bundle of labour market policies aimed at the reduction of unemployment 
and the decrease of non-wage labour costs. The Hartz reforms have played a 
prominent role in the public discussion, but are they really a watershed as both 
optimists and pessimists claim? In this article we argue that the Hartz reform is 
one of the most ambitious German reform projects since World War II, and em-
bed it in an international context. We discuss three views of policy reform: reform 
as a process of policy-learning, as a process of competitive realignment and as a 
process of reinforcing path dependence. We show which of the three paradigms 
accounts for what part of the political result. We find evidence for both policy dif-
fusion and retrenchment, but these follow a traditional German pattern: reforms 
within institutions rather than of institutions. 
 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Probleme des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes und Sozialstaates als Ganzes ha-
ben eine anhaltende Debatte über die Reform des deutschen Wohlfahrtsstaats-
modells ausgelöst. Die Hartz-Reformen können als ein wesentliches Ergebnis 
dieser Debatte angesehen werden. „Hartz“ hat mehr als jede andere Reform die 
öffentliche Diskussion der vergangenen zwei Jahre bestimmt. Aber sind die Re-
formergebnisse wirklich das, was Optimisten und Pessimisten von ihnen 
erwarten? In diesem Artikel argumentieren wir, dass die Hartz-Reformen tatsäch-
lich eines der ehrgeizigsten Reformprojekte in Deutschland seit dem 2. Weltkrieg 
sind und beleuchten die Reformen dabei aus einer internationalen Perspektive. 
Als analytischen Bezugsrahmen diskutieren wir drei Sichtweisen von Politikrefor-
men: Reformen als Policy-Lernen, Reformen als Anpassungsprozess im globalen 
Wettbewerb und Reformen als Prozess, der die Pfadabhängigkeit weiter stärkt. 
Wir zeigen, welches Paradigma welchen Teil der Reform erklären kann. Es las-
sen sich sowohl für das Policy-Lernen als auch den Rückbau des Sozialstaates 
Anhaltspunkte finden, allerdings folgen diese einem typisch deutschen Muster: 
eher Reformen innerhalb der Institutionen als die Reform der Institutionen selbst. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2003, West European Politics published a special issue on the German situa-
tion at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Germany was characterised as a 
country unable to proceed with the pressing reforms needed to react to declining 
economic performance. In general, the German crisis of stagnation was ascribed 
to ‘ingrained over-commitment to old institutions and historical entitlements’ 
(Kitschelt and Streeck 2003: 28). At that time, the Hartz Commission was seen 
only as a political manoeuvre of Chancellor Schröder in the run-up to the next 
elections. Now, two and a half years after the commission delivered its report in 
August 2002, the Hartz reforms can be seen as the most ambitious German re-
form project in social insurance policy since World War II. For optimists, it marks 
a first step away from stagnation and proves Germany’s ability to make funda-
mental reform. For pessimists, the outcome of the reform shows either that 
institutional inertia is still too great to allow for more fundamental reforms or that 
the reform already has gone too far by opening Pandora’s box of neoliberal de-
regulation. 
The Hartz Commission was set up by Chancellor Schröder to reform the ineffi-
cient Public Employment Service (PES)1 and labour market policy more 
generally. The establishment of the commission was a direct response to a report 
from the German Federal Audit Court (Bundesrechnungshof) which discovered 
that officials of the PES falsified their placement statistics in order to announce 
higher activity levels. Given the reputation of the PES for its chronic budget deficit 
and its low level of efficiency, the media transformed this revelation into the so-
called placement scandal (Vermittlungsskandal). The scandal became a rare 
window of opportunity (Kindgon 1984). The Schröder government used this win-
dow of opportunity to appoint a Commission for Modern Services on the Labour 
Market, which became known as the Hartz Commission, named after its chair-
man Peter Hartz, the human resources director of Volkswagen. The fifteen 
members were drawn from a broad spectrum of society, including the sciences, 
the social partners, business consulting companies, large enterprises and poli-
tics. This strategy indicated a shift away from former tripartite reform approaches, 
such as the Alliance for Jobs (Bündnis für Arbeit) from late 1998 to 2001, which 
built exclusively on efforts by the social partners to find solutions to the unem-
ployment crisis in Germany (Streeck and Hassel 2003). In contrast to the Alliance 
for Jobs, though, the commission’s task was narrower, as it was only to suggest 
policies for institutional reform of the PES and active and passive labour market 
                                            
1   The German PES was called the Federal Institute for Employment (Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit) but was renamed the Federal Agency for Employment (Bundesagentur für Ar-
beit) as part of the Hartz reforms. 
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policy. It was not the task of the commission to deliberate about the entire set of 
labour market and employment policies, especially not about macro-economic 
policy (e.g. wages) or employment protection regulations.  
After six months the Hartz Commission (2002) presented its report, which con-
sisted of thirteen modules for reform. Chancellor Schröder made the Hartz 
reforms one of the top priorities of his second term in office and promised to im-
plement the proposal ‘one to one’, that is, without major compromises pressed for 
by the social partners, in particular the unions; his own party, the Social Democ-
rats; or his smaller coalition party, the Greens. Following public discussion and 
difficult negotiations, in particular with the Christian Democrats, who had to agree 
to the acts in the Second Chamber of Parliament, two-thirds of the modules were 
finally implemented (with varying degrees of modification). The other third was 
dropped. Among other things, parliament decided not to introduce a U.S.-type 
bonus system into the unemployment insurance system for employers that have 
low dismissal rates, and it also did not take away responsibilities from the state-
level offices (Landesarbeitsämter) of the PES (Jann and Schmid 2004).  
So the question remains whether and in what sense this reform truly is a mile-
stone in the evolution of the German labour market regime, and possibly the 
welfare state in general. For that reason the focus of our article will be predomi-
nately on the implemented reform outcomes, which can be classified around 
three clusters.2 First, and stemming from the original task of the commission, the 
reform has introduced and further strengthened New Public Management ideas in 
the PES, the largest public bureaucracy in Germany with almost 90,000 employ-
ees. Second and most far reaching, the unemployment insurance system has 
been changed fundamentally. Third, a number of smaller policy measures were 
introduced to increase labour market participation by ‘making work pay’ and acti-
vating jobseekers through job search and a take-up requirement with respect to 
jobs offered. 
This article considers these reform clusters in an international and theoretical 
perspective. We aim to answer two related questions. First, in what respect does 
the Hartz reform impose substantive policy change in the German labour market? 
Second, how might this reform be placed in the large body of literature comparing 
labour market and welfare regimes across countries? To this end, we discuss 
three different characterisations of policy reform: reform as a process of policy-
learning, as a process of competitive realignment and as a process of ongoing 
path dependence. We show which of the three paradigms accounts for what part 
of the political result. We conclude by suggesting that policy diffusion and re-
trenchment follow a traditional German pattern: reforms within institutions rather 
than of institutions.  
                                            
2   For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the road from the Hartz Commission’s 
proposal to its actual implementation, see Jann and Schmid (2004). 
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2. The Contents of the Hartz Reforms 
The commission’s proposals were translated by parliament into four acts, collo-
quially known as Hartz I, II, III and IV.3 Their main contents are summarised in 
Table 1. Rather than discuss each act separately, we focus on the outcome by 
distinguishing three clusters: first, the reform of the PES; second, the reform of 
the unemployment benefit system; and third, policy reforms to increase labour 
supply. The three bundles have the potential to change the German labour mar-
ket and the welfare state more generally. For this reason, we briefly describe 
them in more detail.  
Table 1: The Four Hartz Acts 
Hartz I (effective 1 January 2003) 
Cluster 1 
(Placement) 
Cluster 2 
(Benefits) 
- Personal-Service-Agentur (temporary work agency) 
- Training voucher 
- Tighter definitions of suitable work 
- More flexible sanction regime 
Hartz II (effective 1 January 2003) 
Cluster 3 
(Activation) 
- Tax/Benefit incentives through Mini-Jobs 
- Self-employment Ich-AG (‘Me plc’)  
Hartz III (effective 1 January 2004) 
Cluster 1 
(Placement) 
- Internal organisational reform of the German PES  
Hartz IV (effective 1 January 2005) 
Cluster 2 
(Benefits) 
- Reform of unemployment benefit and social assistance system 
2.1 Organisational Reform of the PES 
The starting point for the establishment of the Hartz Commission was the place-
ment scandal and the urgent need to reform the organisation of the PES. The 
traditional PES was seen as a large, sleepy and inefficient public bureaucracy 
restricted by law and regulations and a lack of performance measurements and 
competitive incentives. The Hartz reforms were thus designed to increase the 
efficiency of the organisation and the effectiveness of labour market policy. 
                                            
3   The official title for the acts is the First (Second, etc.) Act for Modern Services on the 
Labour Market (Erstes [Zweites, etc ] Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Ar-
beitsmarkt). 
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The German PES is organised into 10 regional directorates and 180 local PES 
offices. In contrast to other larger OECD countries that have adopted decentral-
ised strategies for the implementation of employment programmes, the German 
PES has remained a relatively centralised national organisation. Early models 
(such as the ‘Arbeitsamt 2000’ programme) that were designed to change the 
internal structures were abandoned because implementation was lagging chroni-
cally behind due to internal organisational resistance at different levels.  
The proposals of the Hartz Commission which actually were laid out in the 
Hartz III Act were thus another attempt to change the internal structure. The 
German PES traditionally has been governed by a tripartite system consisting of 
an administrative committee of fifty people. The operational business was admin-
istered by an honorary executive board elected from this committee and 
consisted of representatives of the social partners, whereas day-to-day opera-
tions were dealt with by a high civil servant. This structure was replaced by a 
business-like set-up with a chief executive officer and a management board ap-
pointed for five years. The tripartite administrative board was transformed into a 
supervisory board with extended information rights but fewer formal executive 
functions. 
From 2005 on, the Ministry of Economics and Labour will negotiate an agreement 
of objectives (Zielvereinbarung) with the German PES. This management by ob-
jectives is aimed at separating policy formulation from implementation and should 
give the PES the autonomy needed to implement the necessary measures with-
out interference from politics. This management by objectives should trickle down 
the whole organisational chain and give district offices an increased level of 
autonomy, too.  
The Hartz reforms aimed at increasing the focus on individually tailored assis-
tance. Profiling has been introduced as a key instrument. Profiling is a 
management tool that assesses a jobseeker’s situation through interviews or 
questionnaires, which then are matched with aggregate statistical data to esti-
mate the jobseeker’s needs. The Hartz Commission also proposed the creation 
of one-stop customer centres (Job Center) that bundle all services related to the 
labour market, including counselling and support services from the social welfare 
office, the youth welfare office, the housing office and the advisory office for drug 
addicts. At the same time, the centres need to offer a point of access for employ-
ers that wish to announce their vacancies. The implementation of these customer 
centres did not work as it should have. In particular, recipients of different kinds of 
benefits are still dealt with in different offices (see below). Moreover, related to 
the stronger focus on active placement services is the cutback in traditional la-
bour market programmes, such as long-term vocational training and job creation 
programmes.  
A final thread of reforms in the organisation of the PES is the increased use of 
market mechanisms and the contracting-out of services (Bruttel forthcoming; 
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Konle-Seidl forthcoming). Although the German PES has – unlike the Nether-
lands, for instance – never delivered training or job creation programmes itself 
but always contracted private providers, this process was often carried out with-
out public tendering and based on familiarity with the provider. In particular, many 
observers claimed that training providers operated by the social partners had 
been preferred by local offices, which also were governed by a tripartite board. 
Since the placement scandal, various new instruments have been introduced to 
strengthen the market. Even though the quantitative volume is still rather small, 
proponents of the reform claim that it is a first step towards a stronger public-
private mix to provide placement services.  
The most prominent examples for this new practice are the placement voucher 
(Vermittlungsgutschein) and the PSA (Personal-Service-Agentur). Jobseekers 
are entitled to a placement voucher if they are unemployed for more than six 
weeks. With the placement voucher, which has a value of 2,000 euros, a job-
seeker can mandate a private placement agency to find him or her a job. Private 
providers are only paid if they successfully place a jobseeker. The PSA is a pub-
licly funded temporary work agency to which the local PES refers jobseekers. 
The PSAs receive payments from the PES in exchange for employing and lend-
ing out jobseekers. The expectation was that they would find a permanent job 
through the attachment effect that could be observed in other programmes using 
temporary work as a transition tool. The PSA, which was once thought to be a 
primary instrument for reducing unemployment, has turned out to be of little sig-
nificance. The same is true for the placement voucher, of which few are actually 
successfully used by jobseekers to gain new employment. 
2.2 Reform of the Unemployment Benefit System 
Whereas the organisational reform of the PES was relevant for political actors (in 
particular the social partners), the reform of the unemployment benefit system 
was a major topic for the public at large.4 Even though ‘Hartz’ has become syn-
onymous with labour market policy reform in Germany as a whole for many 
observers, it is Hartz IV specifically that triggered the strongest public awareness 
and reactions. 
In the past, Germany has known three kinds of assistance for unemployed peo-
ple: unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance and social assistance. 
The unemployment benefit system in Germany builds on an insurance principle 
according to which both employees and employers currently pay 3.25% each of 
the gross salary into the unemployment insurance funds. In cases of unemploy-
                                            
4   As a matter of fact, ‘Hartz IV’, the colloquial term for this part of the reform, was se-
lected as the ‘Word of the Year 2004’ by the Society for German Language 
(Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache) because it was said to be most suitable for char-
acterising public opinion during the past year. 
 5
ment, employees received 60% of their last-earned net salary (67% if they have 
dependent children) for up to 32 months (that is, until the reform effective as of 
1 January 2005). The duration of benefit payment depended on the age of the 
jobseeker and the length of time over which he or she had been employed in the 
seven years before unemployment. Once the period of unemployment benefit 
had expired, the jobseeker then moved to means-tested unemployment assis-
tance, which was 53% of his or her last-earned net income (or 57% if there are 
dependent children). Whereas unemployment benefit was contribution-based and 
limited in its duration, unemployment assistance was tax-financed and paid for an 
unlimited period. In addition to unemployment benefits and unemployment assis-
tance, there was means-tested social assistance for which municipalities bore 
responsibility and which served as the ultimate social security benefit payment a 
person could receive in Germany. Social assistance usually was paid to those 
jobseekers who did not qualify for unemployment benefit and unemployment as-
sistance, both of which required a certain contribution period. It secured a 
minimum standard of living above the poverty line and was paid for an unlimited 
period.  
Through the Hartz IV Act, this system has been changed radically. First, the in-
come-related unemployment benefit (now called Unemployment Benefit I) is 
limited to a maximum of 12 months (18 months for people older than 55). After its 
expiry, jobseekers move to the so-called Unemployment Benefit II, whose benefit 
level is fixed at the level of the former social assistance and thus is independent 
of the former income. This departure from the former income is the actual break 
from previous practice, because workers who earned good salaries before be-
coming unemployed will now face a drastic decline in their benefits in comparison 
with the former unemployment assistance, which was linked to former income 
and paid for an unlimited period. For a single adult, Unemployment Benefit II 
amounts to 345 euros per month in western Germany and 331 euros in eastern 
Germany, plus housing costs, social insurance payments and additional pay-
ments in case of pregnancy, single parenthood or disability. All people who are 
classified as able to work will receive this new benefit, whereas social assistance 
will be limited to those who are not able to work for more than three hours a day.5 
Thus, for those having received social assistance before, the new legislation ac-
tually allows them to receive marginally more money (and access to job 
placement services).6 Unemployment Benefit II will be administered by consortia 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaften) between the local offices of the PES and the municipali-
ties. The problems arising from the cooperation between these very differently 
organised institutions with quite different inclinations are manifold. However, in 69 
                                            
5  As a direct (statistical) consequence, the number of officially registered jobseekers 
crossed the five million mark in January 2005. 
6   For the first two years of the reform, a supplement payment is paid to jobseekers 
moving from unemployment assistance to Unemployment Benefit II, in order to guar-
antee a smooth transition rather than a radical change for existing benefit recipients. 
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cases (in comparison with 343 consortia), the municipalities will take over the 
responsibility for Unemployment Benefit II completely. 
2.3 Activation Measures 
The third cluster of reforms concentrates on the low effective labour supply in 
Germany. From a European perspective, Germany has a relatively low employ-
ment rate. With only 65% it falls short of the goal agreed on in the Lisbon 
Strategy of 70% for the year 2010. Thus, the Hartz Commission called for two 
ways to increase effective labour market supply in particular for lower qualified 
people, whose employment rates are especially low. On one level, new pro-
grammes and instruments should reduce tax burdens for low-wage earners and 
jobseekers becoming self-employed and thus attract more people into the labour 
market and give jobseekers greater financial incentives to take up work or to lea-
ve the black economy. Besides these incentives, another important factor in 
activating jobseekers is individually tailored assistance that can help jobseekers 
find new employment. On another level, in order to strengthen the push factors to 
increase labour supply, jobseekers should face a stricter regime with respect to 
job-search activity requirements and the obligation to take up suitable work.  
The main instruments that should make work pay are the Ich AG (‘Me plc’), for-
mally called the Existenzgründungszuschuss (grant for setting up businesses), 
and Mini-Jobs (Oschmiansky 2004). The Ich AG was designed to facilitate the 
transition from unemployment to self-employment as a new, effective exit from 
unemployment. Unlike former programmes, the grants are now attractive for 
lower qualified jobseekers, too, which is in line with the aim of creating small 
forms of self-employment (kleine Selbständigkeit). The Mini-Jobs, as the second 
major incentive programme, should facilitate employment for low-wage earners in 
general (not just the unemployed) and at the same time allow employees to take 
more money home than before. To this end, jobs up to 400 euros per month are 
tax- and social-contribution-free for employees; employers have to pay a flat 25% 
of the wage in charges for tax and social insurance contributions. In addition, 
there are Midi-Jobs with an income between 400.01 and 800 euros, in which em-
ployees have to pay increasing social insurance contributions starting from 4% up 
to the usual 21% at the upper limit of 800 euros.  
Preliminary evaluations show that both instruments are used to a considerable 
degree. In fact, incidence was so high as to suggest enormous windfall gains. 
Hence, the unconditional access to the grants has been changed to a more re-
strictive regime in which business plans are assessed by the local PES office 
before they are approved. The Mini-Jobs also are used intensively, with more 
than 900,000 new Mini-Jobs in the first three months after the act had been 
passed. However, initial evidence suggests that many of these jobs have only 
replaced regular employment that is subject to social insurance contributions 
 7
(RWI 2004). And indeed, the number of employees in Germany has been con-
stant since the introduction of the reforms, which partially supports these findings. 
While Ich AG and Mini-Jobs should make the take-up of new jobs more attractive, 
the Hartz legislation also contains measures that increase the pressure to take up 
a job. Although the reduction of benefit levels and durations is certainly the most 
striking change, other smaller changes, such as the definition of suitable work 
and the sanction regime, are relevant, too. The definition of suitable work was 
altered with the introduction of the new Unemployment Benefit II. Once job-
seekers are out of work for more than one year (18 months for older workers) and 
thus receive Unemployment Benefit II, they are obliged to take up any job regard-
less of the wage level as long as it is not illegal in terms of work content. The law 
states explicitly that the inferiority of the new job with respect to formal qualifica-
tions or previously occupied positions cannot serve as a reason to reject the job. 
In addition, wages can be below local standards or collective agreements. The 
lower limit is defined only by the ‘immoral wage’, which is about 30% below the 
customary wage. The change of the sanction regime is the second push factor to 
activate jobseekers. Compared to Public Employment Services in other countries, 
the German PES sanctioned relatively few jobseekers (OECD 2000b). One rea-
son for this tendency was a very inflexible regulation that allowed only the 
imposition of a twelve-week sanction with the full withdrawal of all payments. 
Since the reforms, sanctions can now be imposed for three, six or twelve weeks, 
and there is initial evidence that the PES indeed uses sanctions more often than 
before to activate jobseekers (Bruttel and Sol forthcoming). 
3. Theory: Learning, Competing or Continuing –  
a Wholly Trinity in Characterising Policy Reform  
Before assessing the recent changes in German labour market policies, this sec-
tion first gives an overview of the major contending approaches to policy reform 
and political gridlock. We distinguish between three broad characterisations of 
reforms. They are clearly not mutually exclusive, and subsume at times rival ap-
proaches, but they help guide the following discussion by introducing an analytic 
separation according to changes in preferences, constraints and institutions. Any 
policy outcome, and policy reforms in particular, may be viewed as a combination 
of changes in the set of beliefs and interests of governments, the relative costs 
each of the policy alternatives entails for them and the nature of the (institutional-
ised) political setting that governments have to respect in the process of imposing 
the reform (e.g. Scharpf 1997).  
A preference-based approach deals with the idea of policy-learning. Govern-
ments update their beliefs in the efficiency of certain policies or follow certain 
ideational trends (Hall 1993). In studies on labour issues, the interest in investi-
 8 
gating ‘best practices’ and applying techniques of ‘international benchmarking’ 
has been advanced in particular by the European Employment Strategy (De la 
Porte et al. 2001; Mosher and Trubek 2003). Political processes are seen as a 
means of problem-solving in that they successfully adapt old policies to new in-
formation. A constraints-based approach focuses on the issue of competition and 
the need for adjustment. Policy diffusion directly concerns the capacity of states 
to implement independent policies, and adjustment is driven through a competi-
tive process. Hence, it is more the feasibility, the costs of a given policy, rather 
than the actors’ preferences for that policy, which change under competition. Ac-
cording to this perspective a country gives way to restrictions imposed on policy-
making. Finally, and somewhat opposed to the latter approach, the idea of institu-
tion-based path dependency rejects easy, dramatic changes and maintains that 
policy reform requires a long horizon and follows an essentially predetermined 
trajectory. We shall briefly elaborate these approaches in some detail and relate 
them to the case of the German welfare state. 
The idea of path dependency figures prominently in the work on welfare state 
regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Socio-cultural or politico-economic differences 
have induced diverging sets of institutions that regulate the labour market and the 
welfare state across countries. These institutions are characterised by remark-
able temporal persistence and have led to the adoption of the term path 
dependence, most prominently in the work of Pierson (1996). Path dependence 
changes the nature of the political game in welfare states because new policy 
programmes create their own clientele which supports them. In general, path 
dependencies are processes with positive feedback loops that create hurdles 
against their own alteration (Pierson 2004). The exact causal mechanism may 
vary: increasing returns to scale, high sunk costs and coordination failure among 
political agents all lead to policies that basically run unchallenged. In times of 
high political distress this has led to the notorious concept of political gridlock or, 
more neutrally, policy stability (Tsebelis 2002).7 The initial adoption of such a 
path-creating policy may have completely different objectives, as the institution-
alisation of a policy frequently is assumed to be unintentional. Cognitive 
processes such as learning and adapting to a particular environment are also 
likely candidates for causing such persistence. Either way, a policy reform is a 
political change that is said to reinforce given paths, rather than lead to quick 
deviations.  
In this vein, Germany has always been one of the pillars of comparative welfare 
state analyses and a ‘model’ of its own (Streeck 1997). The particularities of the 
German political economy have led to a characteristic welfare and employment 
regime heavily dependent on passive social transfers, a sector-wide organised 
labour market and a consensus-oriented political process that guarantees the 
                                            
7   Among economists the high persistence of European unemployment has frequently 
been related to institutions in the labour market and the welfare state (e.g. Siebert 
1997). 
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continuation of policies. A complex set of institutional checks and balances, rang-
ing from the intertwined competences of fiscal federalism to a corporatist 
bargaining structure and a powerful supreme court, guarantee a high level of in-
stitutional inertia. Viewed from such a perspective, the Hartz reform should be 
thought of either as much ado about nothing or as the very reinforcement of the 
specific paths in German labour market and social policy. 
In the wake of a growing academic interest in the role of ideas (Hall 1993), the 
concept of learning has gained renewed prominence in explaining policy reforms. 
When seen as a process of problem-solving (Heclo 1974), policy reforms require 
expertise in order to adjust policies to changing environments. In this respect 
both nation-states and international organisations attempt to learn by adopting 
new forms of governance and monitoring. Two main approaches have figured 
prominently in this respect. Quantitative-oriented benchmarking has become a 
key currency for evaluating the performance of national labour markets on an 
international level (OECD various years; Eichhorst et al. 2004; Schmid et al. 
1999). Qualitative-oriented best practices is a more eclectic approach focusing on 
particularly successful policies that are worth being imported into other countries.  
In recent debates both concepts have led to numerous discussions of successful 
or only allegedly successful countries (Green-Pedersen 2001; OECD 2001; 
Schmid 1997; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Germany traditionally has been con-
sidered a ‘net exporter’ of ideas, as the case of the Bismarckian system of social 
insurance, the dual education system and the German ‘social market economy’ 
(Soziale Marktwirtschaft) since World War II show. In the wake of persistent high 
unemployment, however, Germany has begun to copy some (minor) labour mar-
ket policies, such as the promotion of part-time or temporary work. A natural 
response is, therefore, to ask whether the Hartz reform can be viewed in a similar 
way: as a process of learning from other countries. 
Of course, policy-learning also has a more mundane connotation in the form of 
competition. It frequently is associated with market-driven trends towards deregu-
lation and the retrenchment of the welfare state. Key international bodies such as 
the European Union (with its European Employment Strategy) and the OECD 
(with its Jobs Study) often act as policy endorsers. Though one should not ne-
glect the relatively positive view of the European Employment Strategy on the 
welfare state and its focus on a more integrated approach for successful em-
ployment and economic policy, both bodies share ‘extensive similarities in the 
diagnoses and in the recommendations’ (Casey 2004: 348). Hence, key endors-
ers and the role of (technocratic) ideas may enhance or even create this 
competitive pressure. For the European Union, the Lisbon targets set out the 
goals for employment policies. Because the European Union is at risk of failing 
these ambitious goals, an Employment Taskforce (2004) chaired by Wim Kok 
proposed policies, taken from best-practice examples, aimed at making the 
European Union the most competitive economy in the world.  
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On the level of material restrictions and economic costs, competition directly aims 
at the capacity of the nation-state to implement independent policies and there-
fore to maintain national particularities (Scharpf 2000). The most important causal 
mechanism is economic integration, as it increases the opportunity costs of ineffi-
cient national policies. When analysing the politics of the welfare state, one has 
to assume that the resilience against deep reforms will be higher and, at least in 
countries with fragmented political systems, that the likelihood of tough reforms 
will be low (Tsebelis 2002). Nevertheless, most political institutions should only 
slow down the process of adjustment rather than completely inhibit it. 
Figure 1:  Implementation of OECD Jobs Study and Structural Rate  
of Unemployment  
Structural Rate of Unemployment in 1995
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Structural Rate of Unemployment in 1995 
 
Notes: The figure is based on data from Elmeskov et al. (1998) and OECD (2000a). ‘Av-
erage follow-through rate’ is a summary index measuring the degree to which countries 
implemented policy recommendations endorsed by the OECD; ‘structural rate of unem-
ployment’ is more formally known as the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
and attempts to purge unemployment rates from the influence of business-cycle fluctua-
tions. 
As Figure 1 shows, Germany is not exceptionally fast nor perfectionist when it 
comes to implementing OECD-based recommendations on how to reform labour 
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markets. The figure plots a summary measure of the average follow-through rate 
for the OECD Jobs Study against the level of structural unemployment in 1995. 
Countries such as Denmark and New Zealand exhibit much higher levels of im-
plementation, yet their rates of unemployment were fairly similar to the German 
case in 1995. 
In general, popular support for the welfare state is high (Boeri et al. 2001), and 
the political system entails a complicated set of checks and balances leaning very 
much towards gradual solutions rather than ‘cold turkey policies’. Hence, reforms 
in German labour market and social policy have tended to be slow or, in some 
cases, blocked altogether by political opposition (Zohlnhöfer 2001). Nowhere has 
the tradition of German continuation become more obvious than in the case of 
reunification. Despite the severe economic problems of transition, the territory of 
the former German Democratic Republic (‘East Germany’) imported the corpus of 
social and labour market policies almost completely. In this respect, the final 
question on the Hartz reform is whether it is a sign of the incipient trend towards 
retrenchment or whether, once more, world market pressures and domestic eco-
nomic pressure have bounced off the core of German political economy (Manow 
and Seils 2000). 
4. Different Interpretations of Hartz  
4.1 Policy-Learning: Catching Up with the International Mainstream 
The Hartz reforms show several indications of policy-learning. An important point 
of departure is the overhaul of the system of unemployment benefits. Until Hartz 
IV, the German system was exceptional on the international level. Together with 
Belgians and Austrians, German workers were the only ones in the OECD who 
received unemployment assistance that was both linked to their former wage and 
unlimited in duration (OECD 2004a). As a result, net replacement rates for very 
long-term jobseekers were the highest in the OECD (see Table 2). Net replace-
ment rates show the proportion of in-work income that is maintained for someone 
becoming unemployed (capturing direct effects of all relevant types of taxes and 
benefits). 
The combination of benefits related to former wages and infinite benefit duration 
is seen as one of the reasons for the high level of structural unemployment. 
Workers from older industries who received high salaries (e.g. in the metal or 
coal industry) had little incentive to take up new jobs that paid below their old 
wage, given their high benefits. The reform of the unemployment benefit system 
is in line with academic research and policy recommendations alike. The empiri-
cal evidence suggests that long transfer periods negatively affect job search 
behaviour and put an upward pressure on wages from employees (Fredriksson 
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and Holmlund 2003; Nickell 1997). Nevertheless, it can be argued that during the 
first months of unemployment, generous unemployment benefits (coupled with 
job-search requirements) can act as an efficient search subsidy that allows job-
seekers to find an appropriate job and that improves job-matching between the 
jobseeker’s qualifications and the job’s requirements (Gangl 2002). This possibil-
ity could explain why the new Unemployment Benefit II starts after twelve months 
rather than after six months or two years.  
Table 2:  Net Replacement Rates and Share of Long-term Unemployment in 
Specific Countries 
 
Net replacement rate 
after one month  
unemployment 
Net replacement rate 
after three years  
unemployment 
Share of long-term 
unemployment 
Australia 32 32 22.1 
Austria 55 51 19.2 
Belgium 66 55 49.6 
Denmark 59 50 19.7 
Finland 64 51 24.4 
France 71 41 33.8 
Germany 61 61 47.9 
Netherlands 71 58 26.7 
Portugal 78 24 35.5 
Spain 70 27 40.2 
Sweden 81 51 21.0 
Switzerland 72 51 21.8 
United States 45 45 23.1 
United Kingdom 56   7 8.5 
Source: OECD (2004a: 94, 98), OECD (2004b: 293). 
Notes: Base year 2002. The net replacement rates refer to a single 40-year-old worker 
with a 22-year employment history and a former income of 100% of the average produc-
tion worker wage (APW). 
The reform of the unemployment benefit system is also in line with recommenda-
tions from both the OECD Jobs Strategy and the European Employment 
Strategy, which have acted as strong vehicles of policy transfer in recent years 
(Casey 2004). The OECD (1994) recommended that countries reduce after-tax 
replacement ratios where these are high, restrict unemployment benefit entitle-
ments to the period when job search is intense and rapid job take-up remains 
likely, and impose restrictive conditions on indefinite-duration assistance benefits 
for employable people. The European Employment Strategy advises Member 
States to ‘review placement rates and benefit duration’ (EU 2003: 20).  
In addition to the cutback in unemployment compensation, the Hartz Commission 
also has tried to learn lessons from other countries’ experience of making work 
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pay. The United Kingdom and France are an interesting example of policy con-
vergence in this field (Erhel and Zajdela 2004). The Mini- and Midi-Jobs can be 
seen as attempts to make low-wage work more attractive, a strategy that has 
been called for by political parties and economic advisors alike (SVR 2002: 241). 
Both the Jobs Study and the European Employment Strategy also urge govern-
ments to ensure early and effective activation for jobseekers. The European 
Employment Strategy Guidelines on active and preventative measures for the 
unemployed sets out that ‘at an early stage of their unemployment, all jobseekers 
benefit from an early identification of their needs and from services such as ad-
vice and guidance, jobs search assistance and personalised action plans [...] with 
special attention […] to people facing the greatest difficulties in the labour market’ 
(EU 2003: 18). The Hartz Commission proposed to create so-called one-stop 
shops that integrate all services for all jobseekers at one place (including benefit 
claims, job placement, rent assistance, drug and debt counselling, etc.). This rec-
ommendation is in line with a general international trend towards single gateways 
for social and labour market assistance (Clasen et al. 2001). The main examples 
for Germany were the Centres for Work and Income in the Netherlands and Job-
centre Plus in the United Kingdom (Fleckenstein 2004). 
The one-stop shops should also streamline assistance. Jobseekers will be classi-
fied according to their needs, and the hardest to help will be subject to case 
management, a highly individually tailored form of assistance. For those with the 
greatest distance from the labour market, one case manager will be responsible 
for 150 clients. In the old system, due to problems of missed targeting, job coun-
sellors had caseloads of up to 700 jobseekers. Thus, the stricter benefit regime is 
accompanied by a higher level of assistance and activation. The targeting of as-
sistance and the activation of jobseekers again draws from experience in other, 
more successful, countries such as Denmark and the United Kingdom (Flecken-
stein 2004). However, in the transition period jobseekers will be affected by the 
new benefit rules from the outset, whereas the higher level of assistance will only 
be phased in over the next one or two years. This is a clear indication of who has 
to shoulder the major share of the costs of adjustment, namely, the unemployed 
themselves. 
Finally, policy-learning is also evident in the New Public Management reforms of 
the PES structures. New Public Management is a rather loose term for deliberate 
changes to the structures and processes of public sector organisations, with the 
aim of increasing their efficiency and effectiveness (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
Although one-stop shops certainly can be seen as part of this reform agenda, a 
more recent development is the use of contracts for the governance of public 
employment services (Sol and Westerveld forthcoming). In this vein, we can in-
terpret the introduction of the agreement of objectives between the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labour and the PES (Fleckenstein 2004; Mosley et al. 
2001) as an introduction of contractual arrangements. In addition, the contracting 
of private providers for the delivery of placement services is an international trend 
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that has been taken up reluctantly by the PES but is now evident as well, for in-
stance in the placement voucher and the PSA (Bruttel forthcoming).  
4.2 Competitive Realignment: The Beginning of an Age  
of Retrenchment? 
The overhaul of the unemployment benefit system has not been uncontroversial, 
however. After the Hartz IV Act was passed, more than one hundred thousand 
people protested on the streets for several weeks in a row, the vast majority of 
them in cities in eastern Germany.8 These demonstrations were not led by large 
organisations, such as the trade unions, but were grassroots protest actions. 
They revealed people’s fear that Hartz IV will have substantially negative conse-
quences for their life, even though protests faded away once it became clear that 
the political parties were not prepared to turn away from their compromise on the 
new benefit legislation. 
The fact that demonstrations took place mainly in eastern Germany can be ex-
plained by the benefit composition among East German workers. Most East 
German jobseekers became unemployed after reunification and were thus eligi-
ble for the comparatively generous wage-based unemployment assistance of 
unlimited duration. Hence, Hartz IV did affect their status and benefit income in 
particular, as their benefits will be reduced to a new flat rate that represents clear 
losses for people depending on social transfers. The cuts in unemployment bene-
fits for the long-term unemployed show that the system of status orientation, 
arguably the backbone of the German welfare system, has been relinquished for 
a large share of the dependent population. 
In addition to the lower benefit levels, the Hartz legislation also increased the 
pressure on jobseekers to take up jobs. In particular for long-term jobseekers, 
definitions of ‘suitable work’ have been tightened. The requirement to take up 
jobs irrespective of a jobseeker’s occupational status before becoming unem-
ployed is again a radical break from Germany’s status- and occupation-oriented 
unemployment benefit regime. Whereas unemployment compensation usually 
was designed to allow jobseekers to maintain their standard of living, Hartz IV 
only guarantees them a level of benefits that is high enough to secure a subsis-
tence level. The changes in the definition of suitable work may be the basis for a 
stronger ‘work first’ orientation in labour market policy, which would follow Anglo-
Saxon traditions in which any job is seen as a better outcome than no job at all 
                                            
8   Actually, some of the organisers tried to link these demonstrations to the tradition of 
the so-called Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen (Leipzig Monday Demonstrations), 
political protest rallies that ultimately toppled the former East German government in 
1989. 
 15
(Bruttel and Sol forthcoming). The changes underway in the rather lax sanction 
regime are also part of this development. 
For some observers, in particular trade unions, the reduction of unemployment 
benefits is the wrong approach to combating unemployment in eastern Germany, 
as they assume that the chronic shortage in vacancies is the actual cause of un-
employment. Most economists, on the other hand, argue that lower benefit levels 
and shorter benefit durations will be able to create new jobs in the low-wage sec-
tor because the gap between actual wages and unemployment benefits will 
increase (SVR 2002). In fact, Sinn and Westermann (2001) even argue that east-
ern Germany is similar to the Italian Mezzogiorno in that high transfer payments 
inhibit sustainable economic growth. Low benefit levels may be able to change 
the wage structures and occupational mobility, especially for long-term job-
seekers. Spill-over effects into the labour market regime itself may emerge, 
because greater and more intense search activities by unemployed persons will 
necessarily influence wage bargaining on the lower end of the scale.  
The reform of the unemployment compensation system also was designed to 
reduce non-wage labour costs. Though never officially stated, the Hartz reform 
was not just a labour market reform but also a reform to consolidate German so-
cial expenditures, of which labour affairs represent some 12%.9 The Hartz 
package initially was expected to reduce transfers to the PES by some 5 billion 
euros – not very much given the size of the social budget, but a noticeable cut 
nonetheless. All in all, the massive protests against the Hartz reform, notably 
after and not during the bargaining period, as well as the toughness of Hartz I 
and IV suggest that the reform was not merely cheap talk and that it has a con-
siderable component of retrenchment attached to it. 
4.3 Path Dependency: Reforms within the Institutional System 
Hence, there is some retrenchment generated by the Hartz laws, but it is not 
substantive given the size of the German welfare state. This prompts the ques-
tions of whether path dependency posed serious obstacles to an ample reform, 
and to what extent the Hartz reform is a policy change along the lines of the 
German historic trajectory, conserving the so-called German model. To answer 
these questions we must change the analytic focus and also investigate the po-
litical failures and political ‘non-decisions’, that is, those crucial questions that 
have been either suppressed or dropped from the political agenda, when the 
Hartz legislation was in the bargaining phase. In addition, the reform as it has 
finally been implemented differs in some respects from the proposals of the 
commission. 
                                            
9   Total expenditure for labour market policy was about 65 billion euros in comparison 
with a ‘social budget’ of 540 billion in 2001 (BMGS 2001). 
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The most important example is again linked to Hartz IV. The Hartz Commission’s 
intention was to give the responsibility for all jobseekers to one institution (which 
they called a ‘Job Center’). For the sake of coherence, it was suggested that the 
PES should take over this role and be supported by the municipalities. The estab-
lishment of such a structure, which would have taken away responsibility from the 
municipalities, was stopped by the conservative opposition party.  
Indeed, the outcome of the organisational arrangement of Hartz IV is a prime 
example of the German political economy, which has been described as ‘inter-
locking federalism’ (Verbundföderalismus) that spreads financing, decision-
making and political responsibility across all federal levels. Unlike in previous 
cases in which the opposition party blocked the initiation of major reforms com-
pletely, for example in the realm of taxation and public finances in the latter half 
of the 1990s (Zohlnhöfer 2001), the Hartz reform enjoyed the consensus of the 
two dominant political parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democ-
rats. And yet, federalism proved to be a decisive hurdle on the level of 
implementing the reform. The one-stop shop idea has so far been very much 
diluted by conflicts about finances and autonomy among municipalities and the 
local PES branches. Instead of a coherent framework for all jobseekers, recipi-
ents of Unemployment Benefit I will stay with the Kundenzentrum (customer 
centre) in the PES structure, whereas recipients of Unemployment Benefit II will 
be dealt with in the Job Centers, which are organised by consortia between the 
local PES offices and the municipalities.  
The consortia themselves resemble more a patchwork than a well-governed 
agency. Their artificial creation is a compromise between the Social Democrats’ 
plan to give full responsibility to the PES, which was in line with the Hartz pro-
posal, and the Christian Democrats’ demands to give municipalities responsibility 
for the new Unemployment Benefit II. The Christian Democrats argued that the 
municipalities would be closer to the regional and local labour markets and the 
needs of the jobseekers. In addition, they argued, they would have a stronger 
incentive to reduce the number of benefit recipients because the benefit costs are 
at least partly borne by their own budgets, whereas the PES receives its funds 
from contributions and the federal budget. Putting the municipalities in charge of 
Unemployment Benefit II would have resulted in a weakening of the involvement 
of the social partners: they would have lost influence because they are not repre-
sented in municipal administrations. By setting up consortia with rather unclear 
governance structures and very diverse policies, the opportunity for a coherent 
concept has been missed. Instead, highly complex and sometimes impracticable 
structures have been created.10 In other words, this process is a typical reflex of a 
                                            
10  To complicate issues further, 69 municipalities were given the option to take over all 
Unemployment Benefit II recipients. Thus, in these 69 municipalities the conservative 
opposition’s concept is tested and will be evaluated against the results of the consor-
tia. This could prove to be one of the few cases of competitive federalism in Germany. 
 17
corporatist welfare state with a long-established tradition of creating self-
administrated authorities.  
The same path dependency seems to hold for the organisational reform of the 
PES. The aim of the reform of the PES was an increase in autonomy for the local 
offices. The opposite has emerged since the reform: the number of directives 
from the headquarters increased from 69 in 2001 to 136 in 2003 (Vaut 2004, own 
research). In addition, the new instruments for the contracting-out of employment 
services are still used by the PES in a legalistic ‘commissioning tradition’ rather 
than in a modern management approach in the spirit of ‘quasi-markets’ (Konle-
Seidl forthcoming). In future it will be interesting to observe whether a large public 
bureaucracy like the German PES is able to adopt to new organisation and man-
agement cultures. Most notably, the Hartz reform did not break with the influence 
of corporatism and the industrial partners on the PES and, thus, the unemploy-
ment insurance. In other countries, such as the Netherlands, the state has ended 
tripartist governance of social insurance bodies because the social partners did 
not seem to act in the general interest but rather acted in favour of their own ad-
vantage at the expense of the general public (De Gier and Ooijens 2004). For 
Germany, the resignation of the new chief executive officer of the Federal Agency 
for Employment, Florian Gerster, under the pressure of the trade union members 
of the supervisory board raised doubts about how far the social partners really 
limit themselves to supervisory functions and how far they actually are pursuing 
their own interests. 
Another example of policy failure is the PSA. Initially, these public-funded tempo-
rary work agencies were thought to absorb up to half a million unemployed 
people, but during the negotiations of Hartz I it soon became obvious that the 
German industrial partners insisted on the insertion of these temporary employ-
ees into the collective wage system (Tariflohnsystem). The major fear was, of 
course, that effective PSAs could provide pools of cheap labour, thereby intro-
ducing a substantial low-wage sector in the German labour market that would, 
sooner or later, undermine the system of wage-bargaining so pre-eminent in the 
labour market regime. Because the autonomy of collective bargaining is one of 
the fundamental pillars of the German political economy, the path dependence of 
this aspect of the labour market regime is particularly strong. As a consequence, 
only some 40,000 jobseekers are currently employed by PSAs. 
Path dependencies are also obvious with respect to the activation measures 
whose aim is ‘making work pay’. The policy concepts had an insular character. 
The Mini- and Midi-Jobs, for instance, reduced social contribution payments for 
low-wage earners but did not tackle the general problem of the financing of social 
contributions. It is interesting to note that these measures have never been con-
sidered in combination with a general reform of the tax and transfer system, even 
though the negative employment effect of social contributions, and not income 
taxation as a source of revenue, has been established (Ganghof 2004; Kemmer-
ling 2005).  
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Last but not least, the reform of the unemployment benefit system itself is not 
only about retrenchment. Unemployment assistance as a policy programme was 
a ‘stranger’ in the German Bismarckian welfare state. On the expenditure side, it 
clearly was related to previous wages and therefore, like public pensions and 
unemployment benefits, was a case of status orientation. On the revenue side, 
however, it was financed exclusively through taxation, which makes it more akin 
to systems in Australia and the United Kingdom. To cut this instrument and to 
integrate it into basic income assistance is thus also a means of focusing scarce 
resources on the insurance aspect of unemployment benefits rather than on re-
distribution. In this sense, Hartz may prove to have a reinforcing rather than a 
path-switching effect in the mid to long term. 
5. Conclusion 
What started as a political scandal about falsified placement figures of the PES 
turned out to be the instigation of the most significant reform of the German wel-
fare state in recent decades. For our analysis, we have clustered the Hartz 
reform into three bundles: the organisational reform of the PES, the reform of the 
unemployment benefit system and the measure of activation. We have found 
indications for policy-learning in all areas, either from best practices or from policy 
proposals by the European Union and the OECD, which themselves stem from 
extensive international theoretical and empirical research. At the same time, the 
Hartz reform was not a decisive rupture of the institutional system but rather a 
reform of policies within this system with the same set of key actors and institu-
tions involved as before. Typical path-dependent structures of the German 
welfare state, in particular fiscal federalism between the PES and the municipali-
ties and the internal structure of the PES, have inhibited a broader, large-scale 
policy transfer. 
Notwithstanding institutional path dependencies, it is particularly the reform of the 
unemployment system (Hartz IV) that has affected the character of the German 
welfare state and led to claims of the first signs of retrenchment. This change is 
felt especially by individual jobseekers, whereas overall social welfare spending 
is affected relatively little in the short run. However, as we have argued, there has 
been a radical divergence from the German system of wage-related welfare. In 
place of benefit levels that allowed unemployed people to maintain their standard 
of living, the new Unemployment Benefit II is designed to prevent poverty, not to 
secure previous living standards. The extent to which this reform will facilitate, for 
instance, the development of the low-wage sector is unclear at the moment. The 
break in the principle system design may open up new paths for future reforms 
that could go far beyond the labour market and relate to other fields of the wel-
fare state, too.  
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Our analysis has dealt mainly with providing a broad overview of the Hartz reform 
and has placed this reform in an international perspective. We have found that 
the Hartz reforms indeed represent a substantial change and have outlined the 
basic direction of that change. We have thus prepared the ground for future re-
search which should investigate the role of particular key actors such as political 
parties and interest groups in shaping the components of the Hartz package.  
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